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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE srAT E OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
PATRICIA BOALS I ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
vs. ) AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
) 
JACK MICHAEL BOALS I ) Case No. 1817 2 
) 
Defendant-Respondent, ) 
and Cross-Appellant.. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
N\TURE OF THE CASE 
This is a cross appeal by respondent of those portions 
of a decree of divorce which awarded only temporary custody of 
the minor child of the parties to respondent and alimony to the 
appellant. 
DISPOSI ·rION IN LOWER COURr 
This matter was tried in the Third Judicial District 
Court for summit County, state of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. 
Croft presiding, on Wednesday, September 9, 1981, and Friday, 
October 2, 19 81. The co u rt f i 1 e d it s memorandum de c is ion on 
October 25, 1981, awarding temporary custody of the minor child 
of the parties to respondent and alimony during a temporary 
pendency period to the appellant. Shortly thereafter, proposed 
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findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce were 
submitted to the court. Trial counsel for the appellant with-
drew and present counsel appeared in her behalf. Motions to 
modify the ruling and objections to the proposed findings, 
conclusions and decree were heard by the court who then issued 
a supplemental memorandum opinion on December 8, 1981, in which 
the motions of each of the parties for an immediate award of 
permanent custody were rejected. The findings, conclusions and 
decree were then executed and entered on December 21, 1981. 
The appeals (now consolidated) to this Court were filed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of that portion of the 
decision of the trial court which granted him temporary custody 
of the minor child of the parties but seeks to have that award 
modified by this Court to make it permanent and seeks reversal 
of the award of alimony to the appellant. 
FACTS 
Respondent does not accept the statement of facts sub-
mitted by appellant as he believes they are not a statement of 
facts, they are an argument of appellant's case. Accordingly, 
respondent would submit the following as a statement of facts. 
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The parties were married at Steelton, Pennsylvania, on 
November 21, 1973. (R. 1.) During the course of their mar-
riage, they adopted a child, Nicole Marie Boals, who, at the 
time this matter came on for trial, was two years old. (R. 1.) 
~fter this action was filed, it came before Judge 
Leary for hearing on January 26, 1981, and the court accepted 
the stipulaton of the parties that temporary care, custody and 
control of the minor child should be awarded to the plaintiff 
subject to liberal rights of visitation in the defendant which 
included daily contact and week-end custodial visits. The 
court ordered neither of the parties to take the child from the 
state of Utah during the pendency of this matter. ( R. 3 0. ) As 
the case progressed through two further hearings, the court, in 
subsequent minute entry orders, affirmed its direction that 
both parties were enjoined from leaving the state of Utah with 
the minor child during the pendency of the action. (R. 183, 
188.) These orders were then formalized by an order executed 
by Judge Leary on April 20, 1981. (R. 189-190.) 
As both parties placed custody in issue, the motion of 
respondent for a custody evaluation was granted. It was per-
formed by G. Blaine. Webster of the Utah Stat.e Division of 
Family Services. (R. 344-347, T. 35-36.) Mr. Webster had 
worked for the Division of Family services for 22 years and had 
performed 15 to 20 custody evaluations at the time he carried 
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out the di rec t ions of the co u rt ( T • 9 5 -9 7 ) • He di d so , de spit e 
the fact that he knew Mrs. Boals, had worked wth her and had a 
high opinion of her and her work. (R. 34 6.) 
The report stated that the child was 
1 o ve d bot h pa rent s. Mr • Webs t e r de t e rm in e d , 
both of the parties interact with the child, 
loved by and 
after watching 
discussing the 
issues with both parties as well as exploring with collateral 
sources named by the parties, that the child was more attached 
to respondent, her father, Jack Boals, with whom she had an 
open, loving, spontaneous and warm relationship than to her 
mother, who was more distant and less spontaneous or affec-
t i on a t e • ( R • 3 4 4 - 3 4 7 , Tr • 9 3 -9 4 • ) In h i s own obs e r vat ions, 
Mr. Webster was not able to detect the same warmth and spon-
taneity between the mother and daughter as existed between the 
father and daughter which confirmed the information he had re-
ceived. (R. 346-347, Tr. 93-94.) As Mrs. Boals left Utah with 
Nicole in late May of 1981 and did not return until just prior 
to trial, Mr. Webster had trouble contacting her though she l 
knew he was conducting an evaluation for the court (Tr. 101.) 
All of the babysitters who had taken care of Nicole 
were called to testify by the parties. Rowena White, the baby-
sitter for the first month of the child's life, testified that 
both parents had good relationships with her, (Tr. 221-224.) 
which information was confirmed by Beatrice Snow, her babysit-
ter for the second through sixth months of her life. (Tr. 
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221-225.) Victoria Eckland, the babysitter for Nicole from the 
time she was six months old through May of 1981 when appellant 
removed Nicole from Utah, testified that Nicole was very close 
to her father. (Tr. 153-155). Mrs. Eckland related that when 
both parents would come home at the end of a working day, while 
Mrs. Boals would go upstairs to take care of her own needs, Mr. 
soals would come to take care of and interact with Nicole. 
(Tr. 155-167.) Respondent would change her, play with her, 
focus his attention upon her while appellant took care of her-
self. (Tr. 155-56.) It was Mrs. Eckland's opinion that while 
Nicole loved both her parents, she received more attention from 
her father, interacted more often with him and was closer to 
hi m th a n t o Mr s • Bo a 1 s • ( Tr • 15 6 • ) 
Merleen Houston who, with her daughters, also babysat 
Nicole, testified that she had watched both Mr. and Mrs. Boals 
with their daughter and she was interested not so much in the 
reaction of the parents to the child as the child to the 
parents. She said that when Jack Boals would come in to pick 
up Nicole, the baby would light up and sparkle (Tr. 201), but 
her response was much less animated and much less enthusiastic 
when Mrs. Boals appeared. (Tr. 201.) 
Friends, who have known the parties for, in one case, 
eight years and in another case, 10 years, and had seen each of 
them with Mrs. Boals' children from a prior marriage, voluntar-
ily came from Pennsylvania to Utah to testify in favor of the 
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placing of custody with respondent for the best interest of 
Nicole. Ms. Peggy Shapiro, who had known appellant and respon-
dent for 10 years (Tr. 187-188) and had seen them many times 
with Mrs. Boals' children by a former marriage (Tr. 188-190) 
found herself noting and surprised by how much attention, care 
and loving was shown to these children by respondent (their 
stepfather). (Tr. 188-190.) She described for the court that 
when Nicole was adopted, both Mr. and Mrs. Boals shared equally 
in the infant care of Nicole which, Mrs. Shapiro testified, she 
found surprising. (Tr. 190.) She related that Mr. Boals was 
spontaneous, loving, caring and comforting in his care of 
Nicole. From his care, cuddling and confident interaction with 
Nicole, a very close bond had grown up between Mr. Boals and 
Nicole. (Tr. 190-191.) 
Mrs. Shapiro testified that she', felt it was important 
for her to come and advise the court that, based on her 10-year 
observation period, that it was in Nicole's best interest that 
she be placed in the custody of her father, Jack Boals, because 
Nicole would be primary in his attention and he would sustain a 
long-term commitment to Nicole while she doubted that Mrs. 
Boals could or would sustain such a relationship. 
(Tr. 191-193.) 
Mrs. Boals asserted throughout the divorce proceeding 
that:. Mr. Boals had a violent temper while Mr. Boals testified 
-5-
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he did not. Mrs. Shapiro testified that in the ten years she 
had known the respondent, she had not seen him have trouble 
with his temper though she had seen him in eKtreme emotional 
distress when he had learned of Mrs. Boals' extramarital af-
fair s. ( Tr. 19 4 -19 5. ) 
Mr. Richard Snyder, holder of a Master's Degree in 
psychology who worked in the Pennsylvania criminal justice sys-
tem as a psychologist and who had known the parties for eight 
years described the relationship of the parties with Mrs. 
Boals' children from her prior marriage and with Nicole. (Tr. 
2oi-212.) He, too, testified that Mr. Boals was emotional and 
related readily to people while Mrs. Boals was more reticent. 
(Tr. 2 05-2 0 8. ) He related that respondent set beha viora 1 
limi~s, was concerned with behavior and disciplined well while 
Mrs. Boals did not function as well. (~r. 206-208.) He, too, 
testified that he had voluntarily come to Utah to testify be-
cause he had been involved in the adoption process, felt that 
he owed an o~ligation to Nicole to act in her best ~,terest and 
that this concern required that she be placed with her father. 
(Tr. 20 B-211. ) 
On the issue of temper control, Mr. Snyder testified 
that he had never seen Mr. Boals lose his temper though he had 
seen him e x asp e rated a n d d i st r aught • ( Tr • 211. ) On c r o s s-
ex am i nation he stated that all the opinions he had related were 
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based very carefully on his own observations and not what other 
people might have or did tell him. (Tr. 212.) 
Mr. William Isham, who works with Mr. Boals, testified 
that he had seen him· two to three times a week for several 
years and had seen both of the parties with their child and 
knew from his observations that Mr. Boals cared deeply for his 
child and the relationship of both parents with Nicole was 
good. ('rr. 196-199.) He testified that he had seen Mr. Boals 
under eKtreme pressure several times and had seen no temper 
problems. (Tr. 198. ) In fact, he stated that Mr. Boals kept 
very cool under pressure. (Tr. 198.) 
Mr. Boals testified that he had worked for Sylvania 
for fourteen years, (Tr. 18 5) and intended to cont. inue that 
work and stay where he was living as his work as a salesman 
gave him a very flexible schedule allowing substantial time 
with Nicole and which would allow him to be at home every night 
with the exception of once every six weeks when he had to go to 
Rock Springs, Wyoming. (Tr. 54, 55.) He related that while he 
had to go out some evenings to entertain, it did not happen 
often. (Tr. 55.) 
Mr. Boals testified that he felt that Mrs. Boals was 
not as warm and loving with Nicole as he was, that Nicole does 
not run to hug her mother as she does him, does not have as 
-8-
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close and warm a physical relationship and emotional rela~ion­
ship wi~h appellant as he wished that Nicole would have because 
Mrs. aoals was simply not as demonstrative, open and w3 rm as 
she should be. (Tr. 54.) 
Mr. Boals related that Mrs. Boals had a series of ex-
tramarital affairs during the marriage which finally caused its 
disintegration. (Tr. 153.) He admitted to having had a •one 
night stand• after Mrs. Boals had told him close to two years 
before this trial that the marriage was over and she had gone 
through an extramarital affair. (Tr. 82.) Mrs. Boals admitted 
the extramarital affairs (Tr. 135), that she had attempted sui-
cide (Tr. 135), and had used Mr. Boals' company credit card to 
make lonJ distance calls after they had separated. (Tr. 134-
135.) She also testified that while the par~ies had agreed and 
that it was important that an education'al fund be set up for 
their daughter, she believed that money should be divided be-
tween them at the time of the divorce rather than retained for 
their daughter. (Tr. 232-233.) 
Respondent testified that he provided continual pri-
mary care for his child, changing her, feeding her, entertain-
ing her and that their relationship grew from that contact. 
(Tr. 164.) He said appellant e>layed a much smaller role in 
those activities (Tr. 16 4-16 5) , as normally on the weekend, 
Mrs. Boals slept until 11:00 o'clock while Mr. Boals got up and 
cared for Nicole. (Tr. 183.) 
-9-
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Respondent testified that, despite the order entered 
by Judge Leary directing the parties not to leave Utah with the 
child, both parties did so, keeping in touch with the other, 
until May 29, 1981, when, saying that she was travelling to 
Id ah o t o st a y w i t h he r broth e r , Mr s. Bo a 1 s 1 e f t the stat e of 
Utah and did not inform Mr. Boals where she 
peatedly to call her and could not reach her. 
was. He tried re-
Finally, when he 
received his credit card bills, he was able to determine that 
she was in Houston, Texas. (Tr. 165-159.) After determining 
that she was in Houston, he attempted to reach her there and 
finally was able to do so but Mrs. Boals refused to give him 
either her address or telephone number so that he would be able 
to reach her and, more importantly to Mr. Boals, reach his 
child. (Tr. 168-169.) Thus, despite the entry of the trial 
court's order, Mrs. Boals felt free to take the minor child and 
hide her all summer (Tr. 175), despite knowing of respondent's 
concern about Nicole. In addition, she deliberately thwarted 
his efforts to contact Nicole. (Tr. 175.) 
Mrs. Boals testified that through part-time employment 
she earned $5, 700. 00 in 1977, $6, 600. 00 in 1978, $10, 400. 00 in 
1979, $8,500.00 in 1980 and that she had both a fellowhsip from 
Houston University in her graduate program job which paid her 
$5,000.00 to $7,000.00 and a job which paid her $6.00 to $8.00 
per hour. (Tr. 105-108.) She testified that her classwork ran 
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only three days a week and she would be free to take care of 
Nicole or work in the other time. (Tr. 10 3-10 5, 10 s. ) 
Mrs. Boals produced several witnesses who testified 
that she had a good relationship with Nicole. (Tr. 8-11, 16, 
26-28, 39) However, none of these witnesses had seen Nicole 
with her father so as to be able or was asked to give a com-
pa rat i ve op inion. (Tr. 11, 15, 28, 39) Dr. Stephen Trc -:er 
who testified in behalf of appellant (Tr. 22-29) testified that 
extramarital affairs, suicide attempts and dishonesty would not 
be inconsistent with his opinions. (Tr. 32-33.) 
After the initial decision by the court placing tempo-
rary custody of Nicole with respondent, appell~nt certified to 
the court that she had withdrawn from graduate school and in-
tended to marry a financially well-off individual by the name 
o f Law re n c e o . Co r co r a n • ( R • 3 8 4 -3 8 6. ) 
AR3UMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHIJULD HAVE ~~RDED PER~NENT CARE, 
cusrODY AND CONTROL o~ THE MINOR CHILD OF THE 
PARTIES TO THE RESPONDENT 
In the instant matter, the evidence clearly supported 
the award of custody to respondent and the court acted cor-
rectly in making that decision. The evidence revealed that 
respondent had a warm, close, loving re lat ions hip wit. h his 
-11-
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daughter which was much closer than Nicole's relationship to 
her mother. Under these circumstances, the trial court cor-
rectly applied the provisions of Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), which require that the custody of minor 
children must be awarded in their best interests. 
our Court has repeatedly emphasized that the 
objectives stated in the foregoing statute: 
that in divorce cases, the welfare of minor 
chi 1 dren is o E paramount importance in de-
termining custody; Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 
2d 328, 517 P.2d 1019, that the procee1ings 
are equitable in the highest degree; Sampsel 
v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550, that 
neither parent has an absolute right to cus-
tody; ••• " 
Mecham v. Mecham, 544 P.2d 479 (Ut3h 1975). This directive was 
reaffirmed by the Court in Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 
1981) and recently in Nilson v. Nilson, P.2d (Utah 
1982). Judge Croft followed the directive to placement of cus-
tody in the best interest of the child, however, he did err in 
not making the award a permanent one. 
By making an 18-month award rather than permanent 
placement, the trial court erred. The recommendation of the 
custody evaluation given to the court by the Division of Family 
Services, the testimony of the babysitters regarding the care 
of and relationship of Nicole to her parents, the testimony of 
the witnesses whose long-tarm acqu3intanceship with the parties 
gave them a perspective of how the parties had acted in regard 
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to Mrs. Boals' children who were born as issue of her first. 
marriage, clearly demonstrated that Nicole's best interest re-
quired permanent placement with her father, the responjent. 
The award of only temporary custody allows the custody question 
to remain open. 
While broad discretion is given a trial court in these 
matters, Nilson v. Nilson, P.2d (Utah 1982), Rice v. 
Rice, 564 P.2d 305 (Utah 1977), Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 
244 P.2d 650 (1952), the trial court did abuse its discretion 
by not making the award a permanent one. The failure to do so 
keeps matters in turmoil and unsettled, not resolved, as is 
required for Nicole's best interests. The award of custody to 
respondent should have been permanent. 
The appellant attacks the award of custody to respon-
dent because she is the mother of the child and she asserts 
that custody should be placed with her. That is not correct as 
a matter of evidence or law. This Court held in Jorgensen v. 
,Jorgensen, 5 9 9 P • 2 d 51 0 ( Ut ah 19 7 9 ) , t hat w hi 1 e t he re i s a 
judicial preference for the mother of a child in custody mat-
ters when all other things are equal, that does not hold true 
When, as in this case, thinr]S are not equal. As the Court 
stated: 
In fact, the preference operates to give 
custody to the mother all other things being 
equal. Since the preference is a creature 
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of judicial policy, however, it must yield 
to the Legislative mandate that the best 
interest.s of the child be given primary con-
sideration. Whenever, pursuant to a consi-
deration of such interests, any circumstance 
in the case preponderate in favor of the 
husband, all things are not equal. 
599 P.2d at 511. 
In the instant matter, the evidence clearly prepon-
derates in favor of the custody award to respondent. The baby-
sitters who had watched the child for most of her life had ob-
served that primary care was provided to her by her father, not 
her mother. They observed that the primary emotional attach-
ment that the child could express by her conduct was to her 
father, not her mother. This is not to say that her mother did 
not. love her or does not have a good relationship with her. 
The evidence was undisputed that she does. But it was equally 
undisputed l:hat the relationship of Nicole with respondent is 
better, warmer and more emotionally spontaneous than that with 
appellant. 
The evidence of conduct clearly established that the 
more stable and consistent environment would be provided by the 
respondent. The appellant engaged in intra-marital affairs 
through the marriage while the respondent, in extreme distress, 
erred in a sin1le instance. Respondent has worked for the same 
employer for fourteen years. ~ppellant is terminating her 
second marriage. Respondent continues not only his care of 
-14-
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Nicole but that of her emotional grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. 
Eckland. (Tr. 166) 
All of the witnesses produced by Mrs. Boals testified 
to the quality of her relationship with her child but none 
could or did give a comparative opinion as to the depth or 
quality of her relationship as opposed to the relationship of 
her husband with their child. On the other hand, all of Mr. 
Boals' witnesses, which encompassed the babysitters who had 
tended Nicole since she was six months old and family friends 
of eight to ten years' duration, testified that it was with Mr. 
Boals that Nicole had the bet.ter relationship. The testimony 
established that it was he who provided most of the child care 
and it was he who possessed the parenting qualities and rela-
tionship with the child which made it in her best interests to 
be placed in his custody. These same factors require the Court 
to make the custody award permanent and not temporary. 
In 1981, shortly after the district court announced 
its decision in this case, this Court re-examined the question 
of paternal custody in Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981) 
and reaffirmed its prior ruling in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 
supra. As the Court stated: 
In the Jorgensen case, we confirmed, as sec-
tion 30-3-10, u.c.~. (1953) mandates, that 
the best interests of the child be given 
primary consideration in the award of cus-
tody. 
-15-
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639 P.2d at 199-200. The Court then went on to restate that 
while there is continued vitality in the judicial preference 
for the mother where all other matters are equal, Jorgensen is 
the law governing cases such as the instant matter. 
In this case all matters are not equal. The demon-
strative parenting qualities, parent-child relationship, demon-
strated moral standards, stability of employment and interper-
sonal relationships dictate in favor of respondent. These 
require that the award of custody made by the trial court be 
affirmed, but be modified, to make the custody award to Mr. 
Boals permanent, 
on a change of 
Hogge, P.2d 
Annotated (1953). 
subject to modification, if justified, based 
circumstances should such occur. Hogge v. 
(Utah 1982). Sect.ion 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Appellant attacks the report: and credentials of Mr. 
Webster. This is done despite the fact that Mr. Webster knew 
and respected appellant before being assigned to perform the 
evaluation. It also overlooks the effect of appellant's ac-
tions in violating the order of the court and removing Nicole 
from Utah for the Summer of 1981. Mrs. Boals and Mr. Webster 
both testified that prior to her departure, appellant knew the 
evaluation was in progress, yet appellant did not follow 
through effectively with Mr. Webster. In her zeal to limit 
contact between respondent and Nicole she demonstrated att i-
tudes and feelings through which this conduct formed a part of 
the evalua~ion data. 
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As this Court stated most applicably in Jorgensen v. 
Jorgensen: 
We should note, also, that the trial court 
is given particularly broad discretion in 
the area of child custody incident to 
separation or divorce proceedings. Rice v. 
Rice, Utah, 564 P.2d 305 (1977): Stuber v. 
St.Ube r , 121 Ut a h 6 3 2 , 2 4 4 P • 2 d 6 5 O ( 19 5 2 ) • 
A determination of the wbest interest of the 
child" frequently turns on numerous factors 
which the trial court is best suited to as-
sess, given its proximity to the parties and 
the circumstances. Only where the trial 
court ac~ion is so flagrantly unjust as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion should the 
appellant forum interpose its own judgment. 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d at 511-512. 
In this case, a mild modification of the trial court 
decision is appropriate. The evidence clearly supported a 
permanent award of custody to Mr. Boals. The t r i a 1 co u rt ' s 
temporary custody order should be modified to make the custody 
award permanent. 
POI NT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT E:RRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY 
TO THE APPELLANT. 
The testimony of the appellant indicated that she had 
adequate skill, education, training and job experience to earn 
sufficient income to adequately support herself. At the time 
the Court pu~lished its memorandum decision, appellant was in a 
graduate student program where she was the recipient of a fel-
lowship which would pay her from $5,000.00 to $7,000.00 a year 
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and had available part-time employment that would pay her $6.00 
to $8.00 per hour. At the time the matter came back before the 
Court in December of 1981, appellant filed with the Court an 
affidavit declaring that she had dropped out of that program 
and she stated her intention to remarry. The re co rd thus 
clearly demonstrated that she did not have to limit her activi-
ties or use of her funds to support the minor child of the par-
ties. She was free to pursue employment on a full-time basis. 
Based on her employment history and capability no alimony 
should have been awarded to her. 
This Court has declared that: 
The purpose of alimony is to provide support 
for the wife and not to inflict punit:.ive 
damages on the husband. Alimony is not in-
tended as a penalty against the husband nor 
award to the wife. 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utari 1977) and 
The amount of alimony is measured by the 
wife's needs and requirements, considering 
her station in life, and her husband's abil-
ity to pay. 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 412. In this case, it is 
clear that Mrs. Boals was sufficiently capable and free to earn 
income to fully meet her needs and requirements while Mr. Boals 
was in need of all of the income that he had, not only to pro-
vide for himself and Nicole, but to raise the substantial pay-
ments that had to be paid to Mrs. aoals to buy her equity in 
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the house. (R. 450-451.) This required Mr. aoals to pay 
Mrs. Boals of the sum of a£.-iproximately $15,000.00 in 1982 and 
similar payments will have to be made in 1983 and 1984. Under 
those circumstances, the award of alimony was inappropriate and 
should be reversed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case indicated that while both of 
the ;"arties were good parents and cared for their child, the 
•mothering" for Nicole came primarily from Mr. Boals and as a 
result, the relationship that grew up between the father and 
daughter was a very strong, loving, emotional, close one. In 
the most appropriate words of one of the babysitters, Nicole 
simply •sparkled" whenever her father came into her presence. 
The custody evaluator and long-term friends of the 
parties confirmed that Mr. Boals had the better rel:-": ionship 
with Nicole and a substantial long-term commit:.mer._ ::o his 
daughter which they pro.acted he would maintain. They felt 
this was not as true of appellant. 
Consequently, the trial court correctly awarded cus-
tody of Nicole to her father, Jack aoals, but incorrectly made 
such an award a temporart one. This Court should modify that 
award to make it a permanent award of custody to Mr. Boals 
which can be changed only pursuant to the criteria this Court 
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enunciated in Hogge v. Hogge, 
change is appropriate. 
P.2d (Utah 1982) if a 
In addition, the Court erred in awarding Mrs. Boals 
alimony. This award was improper based on Mrs. Boals' history 
of earnings, her credentials, her professional qualifications 
and income potential. standards for an award of alimony laid 
out by this Court require reversal of that decision and the 
cancellation of the alimony award. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11 day of August, 1982. 
C:V-~d~~-
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Respondent 
CE Rr I FI C ~TE 0 F Ml\ I LI NG 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document in Civil No. 18172, pos-
tage prepaid, this J / day of August., 1982, to a. L. Dart, 
Attorney for Appellant, at 430 Ten Broadway Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 94101. 
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